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CHEVRON'S TWO STEPS
Kenneth A. Bamberger*and Peter L. Strauss"

T

HE framework for judicial review of administrative interpretations of regulatory statutes set forth in the landmark Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council' decision prescribes
two analytic inquiries, and for good reason. The familiar two-step
analysis is best understood as a framework for allocating interpretive authority in the administrative state; it separates questions of
statutory implementation assigned to independent judicial judgment (Step One) from questions regarding which the courts' role is
2
limited to oversight of agency decisionmaking (Step Two).
The boundary between a reviewing court's decision and oversight roles rests squarely on the question of statutory ambiguity.
For while courts, using "traditional tools"3 of statutory interpretation, should decide directly whether statutory language permits or
clearly excludes the possibility of a given agency interpretation,
judges must withdraw to a supervisory role when agency choices
fall within a zone of ambiguity left by congressional instructions. In
that oversight role, courts may ask whether an agency employed
appropriate processes or reasoning in making an interpretive
choice. But if the choice was reached in a reasonable manner,
judges must let the administrative interpretation stand. Thus defining the areas of ambiguity within which agencies possess primary
interpretive authority constitutes a-if not the-central component
of judges' independent Step One task.

*Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law
(Boalt Hall). Many thanks to Eric Biber, Ronald Levin, Melissa Murray, Anne Joseph O'Connell, Martin Shapiro, and Molly Van Houweling for discussion and comment.
- Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University.
-467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2 See Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders"-The Courts in Administrative
Law, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 817 (2008).
' Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
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Professors Stephenson and Vermeule's provocative essay on this
issue' offers several important observations regarding inconsistencies evident in the doctrinal formulations employed by courts applying Chevron's framework for judicial review. Yet it ultimately
proposes two doctrinal alterations that threaten greater problems
than any it seeks to resolve.
First, the essay suggests collapsing Chevron's independent judicial task into a "unitary" inquiry into "the reasonableness of the
agency's statutory interpretation,"5 with no explicit mention of
statutory clarity. Removing the charge that judges deal squarely
with the key question of ambiguity muddies Chevron's taskallocation function, thus distracting courts from an essential judicial function: that of bounding agency authority. In so doing, it invites courts to elide the constraints Chevron rightly imposes on the
scope of independent judicial construction of regulatory statutes
and undermines the utility of judicial decisions reviewing agency
action as guides for future administrative choices. It also blunts
Chevron's utility as a framework for circumscribing the appropriate scope of independent judicial decisionmaking more generally,
including in those cases in which a court must resolve a statute's
meaning before an agency has exercised its interpretive authority in
a format entitled to Chevron deference.
Second, Stephenson and Vermeule propose shoehorning Step
Two's judicial oversight function into what they term "standard"
hard look review under the Supreme Court's State Farm decision,'
lest courts take an "unjustified departure from the standard approach" in the Chevron arena.8 While the scope of their fears is not
fully articulated, their formulation neglects the reality that the
courts' oversight role under Section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act9 varies with context. Not all agency decisions
Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95
Va.
L. Rev. 593 (2009).
Id. at 593-94.
'See infra Section II.A, discussing the issues raised by such cases in light of the Supreme Court's decision in National Cable & TelecommunicationsAssociation v.Brand
X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
'Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44
(1983).
Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 602-03.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
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that are reviewed for "reasonableness," whether or not they involve statutory interpretation as an element, invite hard look review. Moreover, that formulation needlessly points away from the
possibility of important Chevron-specific elements of the courts'
supervisory role over the process of agency interpretation. It further constrains the judicial use of deference as an important tool
for promoting an agency's employment of particular decisionmaking procedures in reaching interpretive choices that would not arise
in the context of "vanilla" hard look review.
I.

STEPHENSON AND VERMEULE'S ONE-STEP CHEVRON PROPOSAL

Stephenson and Vermeule marshal three valuable insights regarding Chevron's standard. First, they correctly distinguish two
distinct analytic elements of judicial review of agency interpretations. These they call the "interpretive question" (involving the
permissibility of an agency construction in light of statutory language) and the "decisionmaking question" (regarding the reasonableness of the process by which a permissible construction was
reached)."0 We would simply call these "Step One" and "Step
Two."
Second, they offer compelling support for the notion that the
question whether a statute evidences clear congressional intent and
the question whether an agency interpretation falls outside the
area of discretion committed to its charge by reason of statutory
ambiguity are interrelated elements of the independent judicial
task"-despite the fact that the latter inquiry has sometimes been
located by courts in Chevron's second step. 2 Indeed, Chevron's
language about the "precise question at issue '"" has misled many,
"Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 600.
Id. at 594.
12An example can be found in MCI Telecommunications v. American Telephone &
Telegraph, which asks, at what is identified (misleadingly in our view) as Step Two of
its Chevron analysis, whether an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute goes
"beyond the meaning that the statute can bear." 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994). This point
was made earlier by Ronald Levin, who calls these cases "belatedly discovered" Step
One decisions, in that they ultimately rest on a determination of the boundary of legitimate agency discretion created by statutory ambiguity, the core Step One question. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1253, 1280-86 (1997).
" Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
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both judges and commentators, to characterize Step One as if its
function were exhausted once a court has found statutory ambiguity-that courts only look for themselves for point solutions, leaving the rest to the agency under Step Two. Professors Stephenson
and Vermeule start their analysis as if that were the obvious meaning of the case, a posture that gives their critique greater intuitive
appeal. They then, however, present a model that reveals the judicial function to be that of bounding ambiguity, rather than of identifying single solutions. They also subsequently acknowledge that
"[s]ome courts and commentators ... interpret[] the content of the
two steps differently"'--that is, Step One as judicial ascertainment
of the range of meaning available to the agency; Step Two as review of any agency determination falling within that range. We are
among this latter group.
Third, following a line of scholarship begun by Ronald Levin,"
they properly note the correspondence of the judicial oversight
role traditionally exercised under Chevron with the general "arbitrary, capricious, [or] abuse of discretion" standard for performing
that function under Section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 6
In explicating these insights, however, they propose revisions to
the doctrine guiding each of Chevron's "interpretive" and "decisionmaking" steps.
They first argue that the two interpretive inquiries Chevron
identifies-first, whether a statute resolves clearly or displays ambiguity regarding the precise issue raised by the agency interpretation, and second, whether the agency's choice is thereby, permissible-are, in fact, redundant. The ultimate determination whether
an agency's construction falls into the range of interpretation allowed by the statute is not furthered, they contend, by a prior analytical determination of the limits Congress has placed on the
agency's interpretive discretion. Thus the distinction "serves no
useful purpose."' 7 Indeed, they speculate that forcing courts to begin with Chevron's traditional inquiry into the existence of statutory ambiguity might actually undermine Chevron's deference
& Vermeule, supra note 4, at 599.
See Levin, supra note 12, at 1267-69.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
" Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 598.
5Stephenson

'5
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principle by feeding the judicial inclination to fix statutory meaning
independently and hence foreclosing interpretive options that
might otherwise be left to administrative discretion. Accordingly,
they conclude, Chevron review should be reduced to a single question: is the agency's interpretation "reasonable"? 8
Having collapsed the interpretive question into a unitary inquiry,
Stephenson and Vermeule advocate removing the decisionmaking
inquiry from Chevron's ambit altogether. Inquiring into the manner in which an agency reached its choice at Step Two, they argue,
renders that step redundant with "standard State Farm-style hard
look review" of administrative policymaking. 9 Such redundancy,
again, "serves no useful purpose" 20 but threatens two harms. Courts
may engage in an "unjustified departure from the standard approach to hard look review," by concluding that it is "different in
the context of statutory interpretation than in other domains where
agencies make discretionary policy choices., 2' Moreover, courts
may feel constrained to decide contested interpretative issues when
cases might otherwise be resolved on straightforward decisionmaking grounds. The judicial oversight function, they conclude, should
track "standard" State Farm requirements: "the decision must be
based on a consideration of the relevant factors, and the agency
must offer an explanation that
2 is plausible and consistent with the
agency.
the
before
evidence
It is with these doctrinal proposals that we express concern.
II.

ASSESSING THE PROPOSAL

A. The Interpretive Question
Critical to an evaluation of Stephenson and Vermeule's unitary
interpretive analysis is a recognition that an agency interpretation
may be permissible for two reasons: because it precisely maps a
singular congressional intent on the issue at hand, or because it
constitutes an agency policy determination that falls within the
" Id. at 593-94 ("Chevron calls for a single inquiry into the reasonableness of the
agency's statutory interpretation.").
9Id. at 599.
2oId. at 601.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 599.
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scope of agency discretion that is accorded by statutory ambiguity.
The first of these reasons is of lesser interest in our judgment, given
the rarity of point judgments by Congress, particularly in the context of administrative law. One may note, however, that in this context, the interpretation is properly the responsibility of judicial
judgment, perhaps informed by agency views but nonetheless independent.'
When an agency interpretation is permissible for the second reason, however, the agency choice (so long as it were reached in a
reasonable manner) remains undisturbed because a court in its
oversight role must withdraw and accord it deference. Such deference is explicitly premised on a prior judicial definition of a region
of statutory ambiguity-and specifically, on the "presumption that
Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the24ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency.
In cases reviewing agency interpretations that are, in fact, permitted by the statutory text, this distinction may bear little consequence on the resolution of the case at hand: the agency's interpretation is vindicated. Yet the systemic implications of such a
difference for administration are real. As the Supreme Court explained in its recent Brand X decision, a judicial precedent holding
that a particular interpretation is either required or precluded fixes
statutory meaning to that extent, foreclosing future agency constructions to the contrary.2 By contrast, a judicial determination
that an agency interpretation embodies one option within the zone
of indeterminacy makes it possible for the agency to put forth a different interpretation at a later time.
Moreover, the precise basis of a judicial holding that an agency
choice exceeds the discretion accorded the agency matters a great
deal in constraining judicial interpretation to its appropriate role. If
'3 That is, save for the possibility that the agency's interpretation may itself constitute one of the "traditional tools of statutory interpretation." See Strauss, supra note
2 at 817 (citing Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 314-15
(1933); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544, 549 (1940); Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (noting that, in reaching its independent conclusion, a court may find guidance in a responsible agency's judgment).
24 Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996).
' Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,982-83

(2005).
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the holding entails a judicial determination that the statute cannot
bear the meaning the agency has given it, such a determination limits the interpretation on which any future agency action can be
based. But it does not constrain the agency's action within any
statutory discretion the court acknowledges the agency has. Thus,
under Brand X, when a court holds that an agency construction is
impermissible because it exceeds the scope of interpretive authority assigned to the agency by reason of statutory ambiguity, the
court should not go on to offer its views of the best way to resolve
statutory meaning. Its role as "decider" has been exhausted.
To the extent that courts applying Stephenson and Vermeule's
unitary interpretive inquiry will distinguish between those agency
constructions that are permissible because they are mandated by
congressional instructions on the one hand and those that are permissible because they are encompassed within the zone of discretion accorded by statutory ambiguity on the other, then the proposed doctrinal change is merely a semantic one. Indeed, the case
they identify as an illustration of the unitary Chevron paradigm,
the Supreme Court's Global Crossing decision, demonstrates this
point; the Court upheld as reasonable the FCC's construction of
the Telecommunications Act but went on to clarify that the agency's choice was not mandated by the statute, but instead was simply
one of a number of permissible options.26 Thus, although the Court
did not, in Stephenson and Vermeule's words, recite Chevron's
two-step language in "talismanic fashion,"27 in practical terms it indicated both that the statute is ambiguous and that the agency's interpretation was consistent with the discretion that results.
Yet Stephenson and Vermeule do suggest that a "unitary" Chevron analysis might permit courts to skip over discussion of statutory ambiguity and proceed directly to the conclusion that an
agency's interpretation is permissible.' And courts experimenting
with an abandonment of Chevron's "talismanic" language have
26

Global Crossing Telecomms. v. Metrophones Telecomms., 550 U.S. 45, 56 (2007)

("We do not suggest that the FCC is required to find carriers' failures to divide revenues to be § 201(b) violations in every instance.")
Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 601.
Id. at 602 (defending their proposal as a means of avoiding the situation in which
judges believe they must "ascertain whether the statute has a single clear meaning before deciding whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable").
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done exactly that. Sidestepping the question of whether deference
or independent judgment guided its analysis, for example, the Supreme Court in Edelman v. Lynchburg College found an agency interpretation "reasonable," explaining that it constituted the interpretation that the majority would adopt "even if... we were
interpreting the statute from scratch."29 Such fudging language
permits a court to uphold an agency's construction and even to
suggest that it constitutes the "best" interpretation of statutory
language, without any prior determination as to whether it is acting
in its "decider" role regarding the bounds of agency discretion or is
simply acting as an overseer of a judgment committed to agency
decision. The regrettable consequence is to obscure whether the
court's construction binds further agency decisionmaking conclusively or leaves future decisionmaking to agency interpretive authority.
Far from furthering the types of judicial minimalism that Stephenson and Vermeule correctly endorse, a court that does not engage in an explicit ambiguity analysis but concludes only that an
agency interpretation passes muster (thus avoiding an explication
of the necessary grounds of its conclusion) is permitted a sort of
"aggrandizement by implication." It may invite the inference that
its holding constitutes a precedential Step One analysis for Brand
X purposes, fixing the legal meaning of a statute and precluding future agency interpretations that diverge from it.' Agencies, in turn,
might be deterred from seeking regulatory changes warranted by
29 536

U.S. 106,114 (2002).

'0Professor Vermeule, in his recent work on rule-of-law issues in administrative
law, himself suggests the tendency toward this sort of implication. In discussing review
of agency action implicating national security, in which context Chevron's scope is
contested, he describes that "[i]n general, courts often claim that the statute, correctly
read, supports the government's view, leaving unclear or undecided whether the government's view would prevail if the statute were unclear." He continues by suggesting
a strong precedential read of these outcomes, noting that "[i]mplicitly, many of these
cases might be described as Chevron Step One cases in which the court simply held
that the government's view was clearly correct." Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian
Administrative Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev 1095, 1128 (2009); see also Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Administrative Law Treatise 60 (4th ed. Supp. 2008) (suggesting, in discussing
SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2004), which upheld with no mention of deference an agency interpretation reached in a formal adjudication-a type of procedure typically triggering interpretive deference under Chevron-that "[plerhaps the
Court meant to say that it did not need to confer any deference on SEC's interpretation because the statute is not ambiguous on this point").
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sound policy by the misimpression that a court has already given a
precedential imprimatur to outdated choices.
Minimizing the centrality of ambiguity analysis in Chevron's
framework could have the greatest detrimental effect in a category
of cases in which Chevron deference plays no formal role at all.
These cases might be thought of as those decided in Chevron's
"shadow." They involve judicial construction of regulatory statutes
committed to an agency's administration, but regarding which the
agency has not yet adopted an interpretation in a format (such as
notice-and-comment rulemaking) that triggers Chevron's perspective of "oversight" rather than "decision." In these cases, the importance of judicial recognition of ambiguity analysis as the starting point for statutory interpretation is at its apex. For after Brand
X, where courts recognize that congressional instructions create a
zone of ambiguity committed to agency administration on an issue
before them, their decisions do not fix statutory meaning. They
simply decide the question provisionally, in a manner that resolves
the case at hand but leaves future choices in agency hands.3
Consider, in this light, Justice Scalia's heated dissent from Brand
X.32 The dissent erred in assuming that if a court happened to have
to decide some issue that fell within an agency's statutory discretion before the agency had reached the issue in a Chevronempowered manner, its doing so would "make law" on that question. If one accepts that premise, it would follow that when the
agency later came to that issue and decided it, the agency might be
in the position of "overruling" a judicial decision-a fundamental
separation of powers problem. But the conclusion that Congress
has given an agency discretion over a matter precludes finding that
a court reaching the matter before the agency does is "making
law." This reasoning converts a judicial decision on that matter into
no more than a resolution of the particular case. The court must
decide the case, and so it does-just as federal courts sitting in diversity sometimes decide questions of state law, or state courts decide questions of other states' law or of the law of other nations. In
"' See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1272, 1294-306 (2002) (proposing, and
setting
forth the rationale for, such an outcome).
32
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 100520 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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none of these cases does the decision have precedential value
(other than, perhaps, for lower courts in the deciding court's own
hierarchy until such time as the authority empowered definitively
to resolve the issue does so). So while judicial bounding of agency
discretion has precedential value, any judicial judgment on a question within that discretionary area-that may be required because
the agency has not yet definitively acted-does not.33 Such a reality
suggests that doctrine should be clarified, if at all, to strengthen
Chevron's indication that interpreting courts must address the existence of ambiguity first as a means for ensuring recognition of the
appropriate judicial role, rather than to orient judicial decisionmaking towards a touchstone of interpretive reasonableness.
The confusion sown in this category of "Chevron's shadow"
cases by eschewing ambiguity as the analytic touchstone is evidenced in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rapanos v.
United States. The plurality in that case employed the language of
a "unitary" Chevron standard, rejecting an Army Corps of Engineers' informal interpretation of the Clean Water Act as "not
'based on a permissible construction of the statute."'35 By employing this formulation, the plurality obscured its holding as to the
scope of any statutory ambiguity and the resulting doctrinal significance for the relationship between the agency and a reviewing
court. At various points in its decision, the plurality indicated that
the relevant statutory provisions bear some significant degree of
ambiguity. But the decision then engaged in a fairly ambitious independent judicial determination of statutory meaning, arriving at
one single "plausible interpretation."36 This, despite the assertion in
a separate concurrence by Chief Justice Roberts, one member of
the plurality, that the statute's ambiguity would have permitted the
agency to reach its own distinct conclusion had the agency engaged
in appropriately formal notice-and-comment rulemaking.37 Read
together, these opinions suggest that the plurality's inverted Chev-

3 See Bamberger, Provisional Precedent, supra note 31, at 1310-11.
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
"' Id. at 739 (2006) (plurality opinion) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
6

Id.

31 Id.

at 757-58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative
Canons in the Review of Agency Policymaking, 118 Yale L.J. 64, 104-05 (2008) (discussing Rapanos).

2009]

Chevron's Two Steps

ron analysis permitted judicial foreclosure of an interpretive realm
rightly assigned to agency authority.'
The disorder evidenced in Rapanos, to be sure, cannot be laid at
Stephenson and Vermeule's door. Yet the decision does suggest
the way in which downplaying the importance of ambiguity as the
starting point for statutory interpretation might invite courts to disregard Chevron's suggestion of judicial caution in moving beyond
setting the boundaries of agency interpretive authority, to outright
judicial interpretation.
B. The DecisionmakingQuestion
Courts and commentators have converged on an emerging consensus that the "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion"
standard set forth in Section 706(2)(A) supplies the metric for judicial oversight at Chevron's second step.39 Stephenson and Vermeule take this notion one step further, arguing for a complete
identity between one type of Section 706 review-the "hard look"
review of ultimate agency policy decisions typified by the Supreme
Court's State Farm decision-and decisionmaking oversight in
Chevron cases. Determinations as to whether interpretative decisions are "reasonable" and therefore entitled to judicial deference,
they argue, should depend on the same factors employed in reviewing other agency policy choices: "the decision must be based on a
consideration of the relevant factors, and the agency must offer an
explanation that is plausible and consistent with the evidence before it."' Because, they conclude, there is "no obvious reason" for
treating interpretive choices differently, providing a distinct forum
" See also S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006)
(leaving unclear whether its decision fixed the relevant statute's meaning or permitted
the agency to revisit the issue, where an agency interpretation was not reached in a
formal manner deserving of deference but "confirms our understanding of the everyday sense of the term").
Indeed, a growing scholarly consensus has formed around the proposition that
Chevron's second step, which we identify as the situs for the judicial oversight role,
"should be explicitly understood to incorporate a 'reasonableness' requirement drawn
from the arbitrary and capricious case law." M. Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council, in A Guide to Judicial and Political Review
of Federal Agencies 85, 99 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005); see also 1
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 7.4, at 453 (4th ed. 2002); Levin,
supra note 12, at 1268; Strauss, supra note 2, at 826.
Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 599.
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for reviewing such choices with Chevron's framework can only lead
to "unjustified departure[s]" from the "standard approach." 1
The invocation of a single neatly circumscribed standard of oversight, however, ignores the fact that the application of decisionmaking review under Section 706's residual "arbitrary and capricious" language, and even its hard look variant, varies greatly
depending on the issues raised by the relevant context." And while
State Farm's inquiry into consideration of relevant regulatory factors and explanation based on record evidence certainly plays a
significant role in determining the appropriateness of many agency
interpretations, it is very much the product of the highconsequence rulemaking involved in that case. We doubt, for example, that "hard look" plays much of a role in review of lowerstakes NLRB "unfair labor practice" determinations or SSA benefit determinations. Nor do the State Farm factors always identify
the totality of factors involved in a reasonable process of statutory
construction.
Indeed, there is good reason to conclude that oversight of
agency interpretation should appropriately incorporate factors distinct from those developed in the review of an agency's exercise of
policymaking expertise in light of a technical or scientific record,
the context in which "hard look" review was developed.43 Recent
cases applying Chevron have suggested several such interpretationspecific factors distinct from "standard" State Farm review of policymaking. Such factors include whether an agency erroneously
concluded that a statute unambiguously required a particular interpretation," whether an agency correctly construed a prior judicial construction to mean that the statute could bear only one particular meaning,45 and whether an agency had made the case to
41
42

Id. at 602-03.
See Stephen G. Breyer et al.,
Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 383 (6th

ed. 2006); Strauss, supra note 2, at 820-21.
41 See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509, 511 (1974) (describing hard look review as follows:
"[Tihe court must study the record attentively, even the evidence on technical and
specialist matters, 'to penetrate to the underlying decisions of the agency, to satisfy
itself that the agency has exercised a reasoned discretion with reasons that do not deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent."') (quoting his decision in
Greater Boston Television v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
See PDK Labs. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 794-97 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
See Teva Pharms. v. FDA, 441 F.3d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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justify an interpretation that appeared to contradict the statute's
plain language. 6
Similarly, judicial oversight under Chevron offers a location for
determining whether the agency decisionmaking process has appropriately taken account of other interpretive tools-like normative canons of construction47 or legislative history48-when resolving
ambiguity in the governing statute. It also provides a place to consider whether the agency has otherwise employed appropriately
robust procedures in construing statutory language or determining
the scope of its authority. '9 In other words, Step Two analysis considers whether agencies have permissibly exercised the interpretive
4 See Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that an agency's decision not to put invasive and destructive species of "mute swan" on a protected migratory bird list despite statutory inclusion of the category of "swan" was "very nearly
governed by Chevron step one" but finding instead that agency action was arbitrary
and capricious under step two, because it failed to explain the basis of its interpretation).
"' See Bamberger, Normative Canons, supra note 37, at 108-23 (arguing that such
canons should be considered in reviewing agency interpretations at Step Two, rather
than used to resolve ambiguity independently by judges at Step One, as they often
are).
8 See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference:
A Preliminary Inquiry Into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 501,
511 (2005) (describing agency capacity to use legislative history for insight into statutory goals); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History,
66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 321, 329-31 (1990) (same).
" See Bamberger, Normative Canons, supra note 37, at 118 (suggesting various
procedures courts might require before deferring to an agency's interpretation in light
of normative canons of construction); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 227,
256-58 (2007) (suggesting the denial of deference as a penalty default rule for an
agency's failure to engage in certain procedures to ensure "full compliance with the
congressional and executive mandates designed to ensure robust dialogue and debate
among state and federal stakeholders"); cf. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189, 1237-39 (2006) (suggesting that agencies should notify Congress when relying on avoidance canons in interpreting statutes). William Eskridge and Lauren Baer provide compelling evidence
that courts already vary the level of interpretive deference under Step Two in light of
the procedures used to reach administrative interpretations, attributing the "markedly
higher win rates for agency interpretations embodied in rulemaking as opposed to adjudications," in part to a sense that the former "might produce legal directives that are
perceived of as relatively more legitimate than the typically ad hoc directives issued in
administrative adjudications." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations
from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1147 (2008).
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authority delegated to them by reasonably employing appropriate
methods for elaborating statutory meaning. Such review, albeit not
the type of "hard look" review conventionally associated with State
Farm, fits comfortably within the framework of Section 706(2)(A).
These questions lend themselves to consideration within the Chevron framework because their answers implicate the resolution of
statutory ambiguity, the appropriate scope of agency discretion in
light of the governing statute's meaning, and the boundary between the judicial decision and judicial oversight functions. Yet
when their determination involves judicial oversight of agency
choices rather than independent judicial judgment, the outcomes
should not fix statutory meaning but rather leave a range of interpretive authority in agency hands. This is Chevron's Step Two.
To the extent, then, that the equation of judicial oversight in the
Chevron context with State Farm suggests that the permissible factors to be considered are limited by understandings of "arbitrary
and capricious" review developed in other contexts, it offers too
cramped a notion of the judicial supervisory role. If it does not, we
do not see value in effecting a doctrinal shift in contravention to
current practice.
CONCLUSION: CHEVRON'S

Two STEPS

Although, as we believe, Stephenson and Vermeule's proposals
would muddy the doctrinal waters unnecessarily, their thoughtful
essay nonetheless suggests an opportunity to articulate clearly what
Chevron's two steps involve, an enunciation that, we hope, reflects
their valuable insights.
At Chevron'sfirst step, courts reviewing administrative constructions should begin by identifying whether congressional instructions clearly either require or preclude the choice the agency has
made or, instead, whether the agency's choice falls within a range
of possibilities permitted by language that Congress has left ambiguous. If the former, statutory meaning is set; consistent agency
interpretations should be upheld on the court's own authority,
while contrary constructions must be rejected. If the latter, agency
interpretations that do not fall within the zone of indeterminacy
permitted by the statute's language must be struck down. This constitutes the scope of the independent judicial task.
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Chevron's Two Steps

Once courts determine, however, that the existence of ambiguity
has placed primary authority for a matter in agency hands and that
the scope of that ambiguity permits the agency choice, the judicial
role moves from decision to oversight, and thus to Chevron's second step. At this step, Section 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act sets the general standard, and courts inquire as to
whether the agency's judgment on a matter within its delegated authority is "reasonable."' While the statutory language defining that
inquiry is the same language that governed State Farm, the emphasis may vary. The focus may be on interpretive method, as opposed
to the fact-intensive judgments at issue in State Farm.
Understood as such, Chevron's two steps promote clarity in
judging, provide guidance for administrative decisionmakers, and
supply an appropriate framework for the relationship between executive and judicial action.
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The instruction of § 706 that courts are to decide all questions of law is not incon-

sistent with this approach. What authority the statutory language confers on an
agency is a question of law. Once it is answered in Step One, other elements of § 706,
notably § 706(2)(A), address the question whether that authority has been properly
exercised. Cf. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (noting that if the
agency has authority to implement a statute, the court's review is limited to determining whether the agency has acted within the authority the court independently finds to
have been given it (step one) and has done so reasonably (step two)).

